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Abstract 
Available data suggest that, between 2006 and 2012, Germany may have suffered losses to the 
value of more than 20% of annual economic output on its net foreign assets. Were these 
presumed losses on German net foreign assets coincidental or can they be attributed to deeper 
causes? Over time, fluctuating asset valuations are nothing unusual, per se. Losses can quickly turn 
into profits and vice versa. In addition, the available data should be interpreted with some caution. 
However, this report also shows that there are lessons to be learned from the loss in value on 
foreign assets. First, losses have been for the most part in portfolio investments, whereas foreign 
direct investments by German firms (strategic equity investments) have shown reasonable 
valuation gains since 2006 by international comparison. At the same time, foreign investors have 
also seen profit on their direct investments in Germany. With hindsight, it might have been a 
better strategy for German entrepreneurs and investors to either increase domestic investment or 
make long-term investments abroad. Further, a comparison with investment behavior in the 
United States (US) suggests that the profitability of German foreign asset placement has been low. 
Both countries attract capital from abroad for fixed-interest bonds because both Germany and the 
US profit from the fact that investors see them as “safe havens” and must pay comparatively low 
                                                     
1
 Department of Macroeconomics and Financial Markets, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, 
Germany. Address: DIW, Mohrenstr. 58, D-10117, Berlin, Germany; University of Bern, Department of Economics, 
Address: Schanzeneckstr. 1, CH-3000 Bern, Switzerland. Email: guido.a.baldi@gmail.com. 
2
 European University Institute, Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini 9, I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy. 
2 
 
interest rates on bonds. However, while companies and private individuals in the US have 
simultaneously invested abroad in bonds with high value return, this can generally not be said for 
German investors in recent years. Some of Germany’s net losses can even be attributed to foreign 
investors making valuation gains on their investments in Germany.  
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1. Introduction 
Since 2001, Germany has exhibited high current account surpluses, i.e., it has invested a lot more 
capital abroad than foreign investors have invested in Germany.3 Germany’s net foreign assets 
now constitute more than 40% of its gross domestic product (see Figure 1, Appendix A). Since 
2006, however, Germany has suffered accumulated valuation losses amounting to more than 20% 
of the annual economic performance on its net foreign assets (see Appendix B). These losses have 
occurred even though Germany’s nominal effective exchange rate changed very little over this 
period. Other Eurozone countries such as Belgium, Italy, or Austria saw profits in the same period 
or, like France, were able to generally avoid losses. Even countries outside the Eurozone, such as 
Japan or Switzerland, have seen profits since 2006. Germany is not, however, an isolated case. 
Several other countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands or Switzerland suffered short-term or 
early losses that, in relation to GDP, were similar to or even higher than Germany’s recent losses. 
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The contrasting development of the USA’s net foreign assets is particularly noteworthy. In the 
past, the USA has been able to achieve consistently high gains on valuations, with peak valuations 
between 2002 and 2007. In this way, they have managed to contain their negative net foreign 
asset position despite high current account deficits since the beginning of the 1990s. 
  
2. Profits and losses by foreign asset investment category 
Looking at the changes in net valuation over time, developments for several countries are difficult 
to explain, and seem almost random at first glance. One explanation for this pronounced volatility 
emerges when considering gross positions, i.e. a country’s external assets as well as liabilities. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, these have risen dramatically and much more than production in 
the countries under consideration. Germany’s gross positions overseas have grown by around 
200% in the last two decades, to around 250% of annual economic performance. When a country’s 
total assets expand, we would expect even minor valuation changes on holdings to effect 
substantial fluctuations in value in relation to GDP. In the same way, measurement errors and 
inadequately recorded transactions or balances can cause significant value fluctuations in official 
figures. Determining foreign assets is subject to considerable uncertainties; this must be 
remembered during the following discussion.  
 
This comparative analysis is limited to the US, Japan, and France. Together with Germany (and 
China), these countries comprise the five largest national economies in the world. However, the 
chosen countries are mainly comparable for other reasons. First, they are similar to Germany in 
that they are home to many international companies, which are active in the most diverse sectors 
of industry and which invest in a variety of different countries. In other countries such as the 
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Netherlands, Switzerland, or Sweden, the development of net foreign assets is much more likely to 
be driven by individual large companies. Second, Germany and the three chosen countries all 
attract large amounts of international capital. Investments in the four countries were relatively 
secure by international standards between the years 2006 and 2012; country-specific risk 
premiums were either rare or insignificant. The US and Germany, in particular, were the target of 
capital inflows during the global financial crisis and the debt crisis in the Eurozone, and were 
considered “safe havens”. Both countries are net borrowers from abroad in the (particularly 
secure) bonds category. This makes a comparison between Germany and the US especially 
interesting. Third, all these countries have a well-developed finance system with international 
finance centers. Their finance systems are, however, not so significant in relation to GDP that they 
themselves could cause substantial value fluctuations, as in the case of the United Kingdom or 
Switzerland.  
 
The following section will examine in which investment categories valuation losses occurred.4 For 
this purpose, assets and liabilities are divided into foreign direct investment, portfolio investments 
in equity securities (such as stocks and funds), portfolio investments in fixed-income securities 
(e.g., government and corporate bonds), as well as other investments (such as loans, including 
trade credit and savings deposits). Official reserves and financial derivatives (for which data 
coverage is limited) are not considered. The following discussion will concentrate on the period 
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between 2006 and 2012, because the losses on German net foreign assets occurred at this time. 
For optimal historical context, development since 1991 will be shown in the figures.  
 
In the foreign direct investment category, Germany has suffered only insignificant net losses since 
2006 (Figure 2, Appendix A). German firms have even recorded valuation gains abroad. Valuation 
gains by German companies on foreign assets are striking in comparison to the other countries 
under consideration, and could only be matched by the US over this period. However, liabilities 
(i.e. direct investments in Germany by foreign firms) have yielded higher valuation gains than 
assets, resulting in a net loss overall. Against a background of valuation gains on direct investment 
in Germany, it is remarkable that accumulated annual foreign direct investment in Germany has 
shown insignificant growth relative to the country’s economic strength since 2006, and has 
remained more or less constant since the beginning of the 2000s (Figure 3, Appendix A). This may 
well have contributed to investment weakness in Germany. In the light of valuation gains on direct 
investments, it is clear that investors probably underestimated profitability in Germany. 
 
Since 2006, Germany has seen significant losses on portfolio investments in equity securities 
(Figure 4, Appendix A). Since 2012, these have grown to around 8% of GDP. This is more than one 
third of the total loss of value suffered by Germany on net foreign assets. These net valuation 
losses have occurred in foreign assets. German companies, banks and savers have thus lost a lot 
on their foreign investments. Foreign investors have, on the other hand, barely seen any losses on 
their investments in Germany since 2006, although these were subject to high volatility. Among 
the countries under consideration, the US once again shows high net valuation gains between 
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2002 and 2006. In subsequent years, however, the US suffered losses in this category, while Japan 
and France reported moderate gains.  
 
Germany also suffered substantial losses on portfolio investments in fixed-interest securities – 
more than 8% of GDP since 2006 (Figure 5, Appendix A). Together with an approximate 8% loss on 
equity securities, the total German net valuation losses of over 20% can largely be traced back to 
portfolio investments. However, in contrast to net losses on equities, those on fixed-income 
securities occurred on assets and also because of valuation gains for foreign investors in German 
bonds. One factor contributing to this was probably Germany’s status as a safe haven, particularly 
since 2006; as a result a large amount of capital was invested in bonds that were considered 
relatively secure. This high demand, in turn, pushed up the market value of German bonds, raising 
Germany’s external liabilities by around 4%, at least on paper. The value of American liabilities has 
also risen by around 5% since 2006, underscoring the role of the US as a safe haven. At the same 
time, however, the US has seen valuation gains on its receivables, in contrast to Germany. Looking 
at Japan and France reveals a similar picture. These countries have also experienced a rise in the 
value of liabilities since 2006, probably because of low perceived country risk, while 
simultaneously there have been no or only insignificant losses on receivables – unlike in Germany.  
 
Since 2006, Germany has also seen valuation losses on other investments; these amount to a net 
total of just under 6% of GDP (Figure 6, Appendix A). In contrast, the US was able to show 
valuation gains. Japan and France experienced only insignificant valuation losses. The German 
losses primarily occurred on foreign receivables, probably due to losses on credit to foreign 
companies, while the value of liabilities remained more or less stable.  
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3. Can Germany learn from the USA’s investment behavior?  
From the analysis thus far, it is clear that Germany’s performance since 2006, in all investment 
categories except direct investment, has generally been worse than that of the other countries in 
the study, especially the USA. Can Germany learn from the USA’s investment behavior? This 
question will be addressed via a simulation. We will investigate whether Germany would have 
been able to achieve a higher total return on foreign assets with the same foreign asset structure 
as the US.  
 
To simulate total returns on foreign assets, fluctuations in value and the income generated from 
foreign assets will be considered (Appendix C). This includes dividends and interest, among others. 
Net investment income (i.e., the difference between investment income and payments on foreign 
receivables and liabilities) currently makes up around 2% of German GDP and almost one third of 
the German current account surplus. This is mainly attributable to the positive net foreign wealth, 
whereby more income was received than payments made. However, because valuation changes 
are often much higher than investment income and fluctuates more, total returns on foreign 
assets will often be determined primarily by means of valuation changes.  
 
When the differences in total returns between receivables and liabilities are each summarized as 
six-year averages (Table 1, Appendix A), we can see that Germany exhibits a negative total 
nominal return difference over all periods under consideration. Japan and France, however, also 
often exhibit a negative or very small positive return over the same periods. According to available 
data, only the US was able to achieve a high return difference across the whole period, which even 
increased over time. It would be interesting to see if, given the same interest payable on 
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receivables and liabilities as in the past, but with the same capital assets structure as in the US, 
Germany would have been able to achieve a higher total return.  
 
As a matter of fact, a corresponding simulation for Germany (as well as for France and Japan) 
results in a markedly higher return for the last six years. According to the results of the simulation, 
using the USA’s investment structure would have produced a yield of 5.8% (rather than a negative 
return of 1%). This would be almost as high as the 8.7% yield the US was able to achieve in the 
same period. This thought experiment illustrates how keenly the US can profit from its role as safe 
haven and from low interest on its bonds. Germany plays a very similar role but has been unable 
to invest foreign assets as well as the US.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper asked whether the losses on German net foreign assets were coincidental or could be 
attributed to deeper causes. This investigation implies that, while chance may have played a 
considerable role, other factors were also important. Germany has performed worse than all other 
countries in the study in all investment categories except direct investment. German direct 
investments abroad have developed well by international standards, but there were no net gains, 
since international direct investments in Germany yielded foreign valuation gains as well. Losses, 
however, have incurred in the other investment categories. In retrospect, the question arises as to 
why the Germany’s high national savings did not flow more into direct investment overseas or into 
domestic investment.  
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Overall, the results of this investigation suggest that Germany failed to take full advantage of 
favorable conditions; its position as net borrower in low-yield bonds was ideal for simultaneously 
making high gains in other, higher yielding categories such as direct investment. However, it would 
be incorrect to speak of a collectively erroneous investment strategy. Only a few countries, such as 
the US, are in a position to enjoy gains or avoid losses on foreign assets over a longer period of 
time. Even if it is neither possible nor desirable to follow a collective investment strategy, in the 
long term it is important for the welfare of a country that businesses and investors do not suffer 
losses on foreign assets. Only in this way will it be possible for future generations to benefit from 
the present German current account surpluses.  
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Appendix A: Figures and Tables         
Figure 1a : German Net Foreign Asset Position in % of GDP (Source IMF, own calculations). 
 
Figure 1b: US Net Foreign Asset Position in % of GDP (Source IMF, own calculations). 
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Figure 1c : Capital Gains/Losses in % of GDP (Source IMF, own calculations). 
 
 
Figure 1d: Capital Gains/Losses in % of GDP (Source IMF, own calculations). 
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Figure 2a: Capital Gains/Losses on net FDI in % of GDP (Source IMF, own calculations). 
 
 
Figure 2b: Capital Gains/Losses on FDI Assetes in % of GDP (Source IMF, own calculations). 
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Figure 2c: Capital Gains/Losses on FDI Liabilities in % of GDP (Source IMF, own calculations). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: German FDI Liabilities in % of GDP (Source IMF, own calculations). 
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Figure 4a: Capital Gain/Loss on Portfolio Equity: Net (Source IMF, own calculations). 
 
 
Figure 4b: Capital Gain/Loss on Portfolio Equity Assets (Source IMF, own calculations). 
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Figure 4c: Capital Gain/Loss on Portfolio Equity Liabilities (Source IMF, own calculations). 
 
 
 
Figure 5a: Capital Gain/Loss on Portfolio Debt: Net (Source IMF, own calculations). 
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Figure 5b: Capital Gain/Loss on Portfolio Debt: Assets (Source IMF, own calculations). 
 
 
Figure 5c: Capital Gain/Loss on Portfolio Debt: Liabilities (Source IMF, own calculations). 
 
 
18 
 
Figure 6a: Capital Gain/Loss on Other Investments: net (Source IMF, own calculations). 
 
 
Figure 6b: Capital Gain/Loss on Other Investments: Assets (Source IMF, own calculations). 
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Figure 6c: Capital Gain/Loss on Other Investments: Liabilities (Source IMF, own calculations). 
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Table 1: Return Differentials on Net Foreign Asset Position 
Return on Assets minus Return on Liabilities   
in percentage points       
       
  
Actual Return 
Differential 
Simulated Return 
Differential (if 
Foreign Asset 
Composition as 
for the US) 
France       
1993-1999 0.0 1.8 
2000-2006 -1.1 1.9 
2007-2012 -0.1 6.2 
        
Germany       
1993-1999 -2.9 0.3 
2000-2006 -0.5 0.8 
2007-2012 -1.0 5.8 
        
Japan       
1993-1999 0.4 3.6 
2000-2006 -5.8 2.4 
2007-2012 0.4 3.3 
        
US       
1993-1999 4.3 4.3 
2000-2006 5.8 5.8 
2007-2012 8.7 8.7 
        
        
Source: IMF, own calculations     
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Appendix B: Calculating valuation gains and losses         
Calculation of value gains and losses from foreign assets is carried out analogous to the approach outlined 
in the academic literature. A country’s net foreign assets (𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡) can be determined by their net foreign 
assets in the preceding period (𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡−1) added to their current account balance (𝐶𝐴𝑡) and value gain (𝑉𝐺𝑡), 
which becomes negative in the case of a loss of value.  
𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡 = 𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐴𝑡 + 𝑉𝐺𝑡 
 
Thus, change in value can be derived from available data on net foreign assets and current account 
balances:  
𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡 = 𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡 − 𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝐴𝑡 
This can be summed over the course of several years through recursive substitution, from which the 
cumulative valuation gain or loss (𝐶𝑉𝐺𝑇) can be obtained: 
𝐶𝑉𝐺𝑇 = ∑ (𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡
𝑡=𝑇
𝑡=0 − 𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝐴𝑡) = 𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑇-∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑡
𝑡=𝑇
𝑡=0  
This approach can also be applied to gross positions as well as individual investment categories. Thus, in 
order to determine cumulative value changes to the gross amount of receivables in the category of direct 
investments, the following equation is used: 
𝐶𝑉𝐺𝑇
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴 = ∑(𝐾𝑡
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴
𝑡=𝑛
𝑡=0
− 𝐾𝑡−1
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴 − 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡
𝐴) = 𝐾𝑇
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴 − ∑ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡
𝐴
𝑡=𝑛
𝑡=0
 
 
𝐶𝑉𝐺𝑇
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴 denotes cumulative value changes, 𝐾𝑇
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴 is the current volume of receivables, and 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡
𝐴 
represents direct investments made in the given period. 
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Appendix C: Calculating yields from foreign assets 
The present derivation of yields from foreign assets is accomplished on the basis of the relevant literature5. 
Yields consist of the sum of value changes incurred and income achieved within a period divided by the 
amount at the start of the period. As an example, for the claims in each category j, this is calculated using a 
simple formula: 
𝑟𝑡
𝐴𝑗 =  
𝐼𝑡
𝐴𝑗
𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗
+
𝑉𝐺𝑡
𝐴𝑗
𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗
= 𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑗 + 𝑣𝑔𝑡
𝐴𝑗
 
𝑟𝑡
𝐴𝑗
 stands for nominal yields, 𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑗
 for nominal investment income and 𝑣𝑔𝑡
𝐴𝑗
 to the respective change in 
valuation relative to the amount 𝐴𝑡−1
𝑗  in the preceding period. Calculation for yields which foreign 
countries generate from German assets is analogous:  
𝑟𝑡
𝐿𝑗 = 𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑗 + 𝑣𝑔𝑡
𝐿𝑗
 
The individual yields in their respective categories can now be used to calculate the total yields as well as 
the difference between yields from assets and those from liabilities. 
 
𝑟𝑡
𝐴 −  𝑟𝑡
𝐿 = ∑(𝛼𝑡
𝑗𝑟𝑡
𝐴𝑗 − 𝜆𝑡
𝑗𝑟𝑡
𝐿𝑗) 
 
𝑟𝑡
𝐴𝑗
 and 𝑟𝑡
𝐿𝑗
 designate the yields from assets and liabilities, respectively, in the category 𝑗. 𝛼𝑡
𝑗
 is the weight 
of an investment category among total assets, 𝜆𝑡
𝑗
 is the weight of an investment category among liabilities. 
This distribution of the overall yield differential onto individual investment categories makes it possible to 
carry out simulations to determine which yields Germany could obtain with the same structure of fixed 
assets as the United States.  
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